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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CCW RANCH, LLC, ; 
Appellant, ] 
vs. 
CHRIS NIELSEN and 
SUNNY J. NIELSEN, ] 
Appellees. ] 
) Case No.:20090776-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
L THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL WERE ADEQUATELY 
PRESERVED. 
In its brief the Appellee, Chris Nielsen ("Nielsen") argues that the Appellants, CCW 
Ranch, LLC ("CCW Ranch"), have failed to preserve ssues they raised on appeal in this 
matter. Brief of Appellee at p. 26. Nielsen feebly attempts to raise preservation issues on 
matters that have either been preserved by post-judgment motion or otherwise, or that 
clearly do not require preservation due to their fundamental nature. All issues raised by 
CCW Ranch in its brief were either adequately preserved in this matter or are not required to 
be preserved. 
A. CCW Ranch's Challenge to the Allocation of Future Maintenance Costs 
Was Adequately Preserved by Objection or Does Not Require Preservation 
as it was Made in Excess of the Trial Courts Jurisdiction. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1) CCW Ranch Adequately Raised a Challenge to the Allocation of Future 
Maintenance Costs at an Objection Hearing Pertaining to the Order 
Challenged Herein 
On October 30, 2008, Nielsen filed the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order. On December 2, 2008, the Wilbergs and CCW filed their objection to such 
proposed order, and the matter was set for hearing on January 29, 2009. On that date, CCW 
Ranch made an oral objection to the determination of future allocation of maintenance 
costs, to which the trial court stated that such matter was only properly brought in post-
judgment motion and declined to address it. The trial court ultimately ordered Nielsen's 
attorney to make two (2) changes unrelated to CCW Ranch's objection and resubmit the 
order for signature. Because the trial court erroneously denied addressing the objections 
made by CCW Ranch, Nielsen mistakenly believes the issue was not adequately preserved or 
raised below; however, this is simply not the case. 
"It is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to 
entry of a final order or judgment." Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections. 2001 UT 34, 
1fl2, 24 P.3d 958, citing Ron Shepherd Ins.. Inc. v. Shields. 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994); see 
also, Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts. L.C.. 2010 UT 29, f 15, 232 P.3d 999. Our 
appellate procedures support this position in that a notice of appeal is not effectively taken 
until such order has been entered so as to adequately inform the parties and the appellate 
courts as to the final determination of the trial court. See, UT. R. APP. P. 4(c). 
Although certain motions can be filed suspending the time frame for filing the notice 
of appeal, it is a misconception that a party must wait until entry of an erroneous order to 
challenge an obvious issue before the trial court. No standing procedure requires a party to 
2 
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wait until entry of the order to raise objections. In fact, raising the issue prior to entry is 
typically more effective than awaiting entry and then suspending the appellate time frames 
post-judgment while a determine has to be made on granting an amendment or a new trial. 
UT. R. ClV. P. 59(a) contemplates circumstances where an order has yet to be entered when a 
party seeks amendment of a judgment. Ibid. ("[0]n a motion for a new trial in an action 
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment tf one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.. ."). Thus, Rule 59's precepts pertain 
even prior to entry of a judgment, and the order can be revisited prior to entry of the final 
appealable order. 
CCW Ranch's objections at the hearing held January 29, 2009, sufficiently raised the 
matter of which Nielsen's now complain lacked preservation. The trial court erroneously 
passed on making determination under the mistaken concept that an order was required to 
be entered prior to raising such challenges. A trial comt erroneously failing to address the 
merits of a properly raised issue does not preclude a party from raising it on appeal as 
adequately preserved. 
(2) Alternatively, the Trial Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction by Determining 
an Issue Not Adequately Raised by the Parties Below. 
In Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns. Inc., the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
stated as follows: 
It is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and 
unsupported by the record. Curran v. Mount, Ala , 657 P.2d 389 (1980). The 
trial court is not privileged to determine matters cutside the issues of the case, 
and if he does, his findings will have no force or effect. Brantley v. Carlsbad Irr. 
Dist.9 92 N.M. 280, 587 P.2d 427 (1978). In law cr in equity, a judgment must 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
be responsive to the issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no 
authority to render a decision on issues not presented for determination. Any 
findings rendered outside the issues are a nullity. Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 
Or.App. 721, 585 P.2d 724 (1978); Credit Investment and Loan Co. v. Guaranty 
Bank (& Trust Co., 166 Colo. 471, 444 P.2d 633 (1968). A court may not grant 
judgment for relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor within the 
theory on which the case was tried, whether that theory was expressly stated 
or implied by the proof adduced. Leonard Farms i, Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 90 
N.M. 34, 559P.2d411 (1977). 
Ibid., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984). These findings or conclusions that are rendered 
outside the issues fall within the definition of "excessive jurisdiction55 as follows: 
Such exists where a court, having jurisdiction of persons and subject matter of 
the case before it, exceeds its power in trial of such case by dealing with 
matters about which it is without power or authority to act; and error in 
court's ruling is not synonymous with ruling in excess of jurisdiction. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, West Publishing Co., St. Paul. Minnesota, 1991, p. 389. 
Our Utah Supreme Court embodied this concept in Atwood v. Cox, specifically as it pertains 
to a trial court stepping outside its authority in rendering determinations on matters not 
properly before it, as follows: 
Certainly excess of jurisdiction is lack of jurisdiction in regard to that judicial 
action which exceeds jurisdiction. It would appear that excess of jurisdiction 
means a case in which the court has initially proceeded properly within its 
jurisdiction but steps out of the jurisdiction in the making of some order or in 
the doing of some judicial act. 
Ibid., 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 384 (Utah 1936). Most recendy, our Utah Supreme Court 
has indicated as follows regarding preservation of jurisdictional challenges: 
Jurisdictional challenges, in contrast to challenges to the merits of a plaintiffs 
claims, raise fundamental questions regarding a court's basic authority over the 
dispute. And a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court is 
unique among jurisdictional challenges in that it is not only given its own 
procedural vehicle—rule 12(b)(l)[footnote omitted]—but can be raised at any 
time, including for the first time on appeal. 
4 
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Brown v. Division of Water Rights of Dept. of Natura1 Resources. 2010 UT 14, ]fl3, 228 
P.3d747. 
While Nielsen argues that CCW Ranch did not preserve the issue of the division of 
the future maintenance of the fence made by the trial court, it is clear from the analysis of 
"excessive jurisdiction," supra, that such was preservation was not required. Brief of Appellee at 
p. 26. The trial court lacked authority and committed error in adjudicating this issue not 
raised by the parties before or during trial, regardless whether the proof adduced at trial 
could reach such issue. Combe, citing Curran and Leonard Farms, supra. The trial court was 
not privileged to render such determination outside the issues of the case, and the findings 
thus "have no force or effect" and "are a nullity." Id., citing Brandey and Hurlbutt. supra. 
While the trial court properly maintained jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter 
of the case before it, it exceeded its power by dealing with matters about which it was 
without power or authority to act. Black's "Law Dictionary at p. 389. "[EJxcess of jurisdiction 
is lack of jurisdiction in regard to that judicial action which exceeds jurisdiction." Atwood. 
supra. The determination on responsibility for future maintenance costs of the fence was 
rendered in excess of jurisdiction and should be nullified by this Court as not requiring 
preservation below and having properly been raised herein. Brown, supra. 
(3) Alternatively, the Trial Court Exceeced Its Jurisdiction by Creating 
Contractual Provisions for the Parties that Did Not Exist. 
Alternatively, should this Court determine that the issue was properly raised by the 
parties before the trial court, the determination on future maintenance cost allocation 
exceeded the trial court's jurisdiction by creating a contract provision not in existence 
between the parties. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[cjontracts define the legal 
5 
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obligations of the parties, and thus, when enforceable, set the boundaries within which the 
district court's equitable discretion must operated Ashby v. Ashby. 2010 UT 7, \ 34, 
227 P.3d 246 (emphasis added). The general rule is that "the law favors the right of men of 
full age and competent understanding to contract freely." Ockey v. Lehmer. 2008 UT 37, 
^[21, 189 P.3d 51 (citation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] contract 
functions in part to apportion risk of future events between the contracting parties. 
Moreover, parties are free to allocate the risk of future events between them however they 
wish." Deep Creek Ranch. LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd.. 2008 UT 3,1J19, 178 P.3d 886. 
Contract law is clear that a party cannot expect to be placed in a better position than it 
agreed to be under the contract. See, Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co.. Inc.. 912 P.2d 
457, 462 (Utah App. 1996). This Court has held the following: 
... [A] court may not make a better contract for the parties than they 
have made for themselves furthermore, a court may not enforce 
asserted rights not supported by the contract itself See Rio Algom Corp., 
618 P.2d at 505. "[Tjt cannot be adopted as a general precept of contract law 
that, whenever one party to a contract can show injury flowing from the 
exercise of a contract right by the other, a basis for relief will be somehow 
devised by the courts." Mann, 586 P.2d at 464. 
Ted R. Brown and Associates. Inc. v. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964, 970-971 (Utah App. 
1988)(emphasis added). 
In the instant matter, the trial court ultimately determined—although erroneously, as 
challenged herein on appeal—that an agreement existed between the parties to build the 
fences on the shared borders of the land. Such agreement, according to the trial court, 
occurred orally during a telephone conversation between the parties; however, at no time did 
6 
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the parties discuss an arrangement for future costs ot maintenance of the fence.1 The 
conversation pertained only to who would build the North Fence and who would build the 
South Fence. This defines the perimeters within which the trial court was entitled to render 
a decision of enforceability. Ashby, supra. 
"A contract functions in part to apportion risk of future events between the 
contracting parties ... [and] parties are free to allocate the risk of future events between 
them however they wish." Deep Creek Ranch, supra. The trial court in the instant matter, 
however, erroneously created this contractual provision between the parties itself by 
rendering a decision on the "future events" occurring between them, although the contract 
or agreement it determined to uphold never reached the issue. The trial court was not 
authorized to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. Ted R. 
Brown, supra. In addition, since the trial court apportioned the future maintenance costs 
against CCW Ranch and in favor of Nielsen, Nielsen has erroneously been placed in a better 
position than the 50/50 share anticipated in the alleged oral agreement upheld by the trial 
court. Tolman, supra. Once again, the trial court stepped outside its jurisdiction, as defined 
by the perimeters of the contract it chose to enforce below, and exceeded its jurisdiction in 
its allocation of future maintenance costs of the fence. 1 his "cannot be adopted as a general 
precept of contract law" and should thus be reviewed by this Court and reversed. 
B. CCW's Challenge to the Alternative Claim for Breach of Contract Was 
Adequately Preserved. 
1
 Ironically, the trial court declined determination of the cost of a new fence in the future 
since it determined that such issue was not properly before it at trial and would only be 
speculative. 1/29/09 Tr. at p. 24, 27. 
7 
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Next Nielsen erroneously argues that CCW Ranch's alternative claim for damages for 
a breach of the fencing agreement under UTAH CODE ANN. §4-26-5 was also not preserved 
as the trial court found that Nielsen's fence was adequate to restrain cattle. Brief of Appellee at 
p. 26. Such position is flawed in its undertaking in that 2 trial court's ultimate determination 
on an issue cannot defeat the question of preservation. The fact that the trial court made a 
determination on it supports the fact that it was adequately preserved. 
Nielsen's misapprehended argument relies upon the matter of 438 Main Street v. 
Easy Heat. Inc. 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801, for support that such an argument must be 
preserved. However, Nielsen is incorrect in his reliance upon 438 Main Street as such case 
only applies to challenges pertaining to whether the findings were adequate for proper 
appellate review. CCW Ranch conversely challenges the legal conclusions drawn by the trial 
court from the evidence and findings. Therefore, Nielsen's reliance upon 438 Main Street is 
legally flawed and such issue did not require preservation 
II. ALL ISSUES WERE ADEQUATELY BRIEFED ON APPEAL. 
In his brief, Nielsen argues that several issues raised by CCW Ranch were not 
adequately briefed on appeal. Brief of Appellee at p. 28. In making this misguided argument, 
Nielsen mistakenly views CCW Ranch's opening brief only by its captions rather than the 
substance of its arguments. 
Nielsen first indicates that CCW Ranch argued that UTAH CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 was 
unconstitutional, but did not further address it in their brief. While such issue is not 
addressed in a separate argument heading in CCW Ranch's opening brief, such issue is more 
than adequately addressed in the substance of the arguments contained in its brief. Under its 
8 
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summary of the argument section, CCW Ranch indie ites that the interpretation of the 
statute by the trial court in which it allotted the larger cost of maintenance of the fences to 
CCW Ranch caused CCW Ranch a deprivation of its constitutional rights because they relied 
upon the statue in filing its action. Such issue is further adequately addressed under 
Argument III of the opening brief. Therefore, the issue regarding the constitutionality of 
the statue is adequately addressed. 
Furthermore, with regards to the constitutionality of the statute, such 
constitutionality is only called into question if the erroneous adoption of the trial court's 
reliance on the alleged agreement is allowed to stand since the matter is only deferred to the 
statutes in absence of an agreement. However, whether the trial court relied upon the 
agreement or UTAH CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1, they both called for a 50/50 split of the costs 
associated with the fences. CCW Ranch met this requirement under the alleged agreement 
or statute by completing its portion of the fence. Although Nielsen makes much of the idea 
that CCW Ranch's fence was not completed prior to Nielsen's, CCW Ranch adequately 
relied on the fact that Nielsen initiated the present suit against CCW Ranch as indication that 
Nielsen did not intend to follow through on the "agreement," a matter argued further in the 
opening brief and below. By the time suit was filed by Nielsen against CCW Ranch for 
CCW Ranch's cattle having grazed on Nielsen's land through the fence Nielsen was 
supposed to have built, Nielsen had failed to meet the requirements of either the agreement 
or the statute. Thus, Nielsen failed to do his 50% of the fence. 
However, the trial court determined that Nielsen's fence was adequate and required 
CCW Ranch to pay the larger portion of upkeep on Niels en's inadequate fence. This did not 
9 
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cause a 50/50 split, but rather one that was 75/25 as Nielsen's fence was inadequate and he 
was required to do very little to it in the way of maintenance. This unconstitutional 
interpretation is mathematical and its errors best set forth in the following analysis. 
The Nielsen's make much of the concept that they are a "small property owner" in 
their brief when they do not own a substantially smaller portion of land. At p. 42, the 
Nielsen's brief cites to UTAH CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1(4), which states "[t]he cost of the 
maintenance of the fence shall also be apportioned between each party based upon the 
amount of land enclosed." While Nielsen concedes this portion uses the word "shall" which 
limits trial court discretion, he then misinterprets it by stadng as follows: 
The phrase "based upon the amount of land enclosed" does not indicate the 
distance of the linear boundary but plainly indicates the amount of land 
enclosed in the Wilberg property to the north compared to the amount 
enclosed in the Nielsen property and the amount of land enclosed by the 
Wilberg property to the south compared to the amount enclosed in the 
Nielsen property. Such a formula is consistent ^dth the plain reading of cthe 
amount of land enclosed' by the fence. 
Ibid This position does not equate mathematically. The "amount of land enclosed" is the 
distance, rather than actual enclosure. If an actual enclosure was required rather than just 
the distance of the fence, then the statute would not apply to any property owners other 
than co-owners because none of them would both own the entire enclosure that is fenced. 
This interpretation is further problematic in its practical application. In a simplistic 
form, let us take a piece of property that is square and has four sides that measure 100 feet 
each, for a total area of 1000 sq. feet, with each side owned by a different property owner 
whose land measures only 100 feet by 50 feet, for a total of 500 sq. feet each. 
10 
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According to the trial court and Nielsen's calculations, the "larger property owner" would 
have to pay 2 /3 of each side of their fence (1000 sq. ft. + 500 sq. ft. = 1500 sq. ft; 
1000/1500 or 2 / 3 for the larger property owner; and 500/1500 or 1/3 for the smaller 
property owner). But why are we taking into consider ition the amount of property each 
person owns when both are benefitting equally for any fence they share? 
Let us say the fence on each 100 feet section costs $100. This would mean that the 
"large property owner" would pay $66.66 for each side, while each small property owner 
would pay only $33.33 for their share with the larger property owner. This calculation is 
clearly disproportionate since they both gain 100 feet of fence. 
Additionally, the "large property owner" has to pay for 400 feet of fence, while the 
small property owner has to pay for only 300 feet of fence. So the "large property owner" is 
11 
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getting only 25% of their land fenced in an agreement with each "small property owner," 
and having to pay $66.66 for that 25%, but the "small property owner" is getting 3 3 % of 
their land fenced for only $33.33. The "large property owner" is getting less of their land 
fenced and having to pay more of the cost, while the "small property owner" is getting more 
of their land fenced and having to pay less of the cost. 
If a true adoption of the position taken by Nielsen and the trial court were made, 
then the percentage of the property that the individual gets fenced in as it relates to the sivg of its 
own property should weigh in favor of making the smaller property owner pay more since they 
are getting 3 3 % of their land fenced while the larger property owner is only getting 2 5 % of 
theirs fenced. In essence, the fences at issue herein enclose more of Nielsens property than 
it does of CCW Ranch's property, and they should have therefore shouldered more of the 
cost under their own and the trial court's analysis of the meaning of "amount of land 
enclosed." 
Given that this analysis completely contradicts the one determined by the trial court 
and supported by the Nielsen's, it is clear that the Utah Legislature intended to just split the 
cost 50/50 to avoid such disputes and interpretations. Their interpretation is the most 
acceptable since both property owners are receiving an equal share of fence. In the above 
analysis, the smaller property owner would pay $300 for their 300 sq. feet, and the larger 
property owner would pay $400 for their 400 sq. feet of fence. Both would be paying $1 per 
foot of fence. The statute's plain language indicates as such; however, the trial court's 
interpretation clearly would offend the constitution in penalizing larger property owners who 
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benefit equally from the border fences that are shared ^vith other smaller property owners 
adjacent to them. 
Nielsen was ordered to only pay for 38.88% of the future maintenance of the fence 
while CCW Ranch was ordered to pay for 61.12% of die future maintenance of the fence. 
This is not what is contemplated by the statute. Both the alleged agreement and the statue 
contemplate equal sharing of maintenance costs. However, the trial court ordered the future 
maintenance on the fences be handled as is mentiored supra when such order is not 
provided for under statute or the alleged agreement. Therefore, should the decision of the 
trial court be upheld the constitutionality7 of the statue is questionable because it allows 
flexibility7 in the statute regarding future maintenance of the fence and causes the plain 
language of the statue to be unreliable. CCW Ranch relied upon the plain language of the 
statue in constructing their fences and such reliance has since become a detriment to them 
through the misinterpretation by the trial court that has been challenged herein. An inability 
to rely upon the plain language of a statute renders such statute unconstitutionally vague. 
Next Nielsen argues that CCW Ranch failed to adequately address how the same 
statue discriminated against large property7 owners. While this issue is also not raised in a 
separate argument in its brief, it is adequately addressed under Argument III of the opening 
brief, and is further supported by the analysis supra. Cleirly the interpretation of the statute 
as the trial court and Nielsen read it would prejudice larger property7 owners in a 
disproportionate share of the cost of a fence that both property owners benefit from equally. 
This is obvious to any property owners, not just those owning large ranch properties. 
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Further, Nielsen argues that CCW Ranch raised issue with the statutory interpretation 
of UTAH CODE A N N . §4-26-5.1 and included legal authority regarding such issue but provide 
no analysis for this issue. Nielsen misapprehends CCW Ranch's opening brief and 
apparently overlooked the analysis for this issue as contained under Argument I therein. 
Nielsen's argument against adequate briefing of the issues is simply grasping at straws 
in his misguided attempts to circumvent determination on the merits of this case. This is 
likely since Nielsen recognises the flaws in both the tria court's interpretation and his own 
position. CCW Ranch adequately briefed all issues contained within its brief. While such 
issues may not be contained in separate arguments, they are contained and analyzed 
throughout the brief. 
III. N O A G R E E M E N T E X I S T E D I N T H I S MATTER. 
In the Brief of Appelleei, Nielsen argues that the trial court made the correct 
determination with respect to the existence of an agreement between the parties in this 
matter. Brief of Appellee at p. 31. Even Nielsen did not believe this argument until closing 
arguments below when he made it as a feeble suggestion to the trial court as an alternative 
upon full presentation of the evidence below. 
"In determining whether the parties created an enforceable contract, a court should 
consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and counteroffers and interpret the various 
expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding whether the parties reached agreement 
on complete and definite terms." Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake. 2003 UT 17, f l 7, 71 
P.3d 589. Existence of oral contracts must show that "there had been a meeting of the 
minds with respect to such oral contracts, or .. . establish any consideration to support such 
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contracts." Nelson v. Newman. 583 P.2d 601, 602-(>03 (Utah 1978). In fact, "[i]t is 
fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential 
to the formation of a contract." L P III. LLC v. BBRD. L C 2009 UT App 301, f l4, 221 
P.3d 867, citing Richard Barton Enters v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). 
Furthermore, "[sjpecific enforcement of a contract depends on whether the 
obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient clarity and definiteness that the 
contract can be performed according to its terms." Eiason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427, 429 
(Utah, 1980) citing Ferris v. Jennings. Utah, 595 P.2d 857 (1979); Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 
Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[contracts define 
the legal obligations of the parties, and thus, when enforceable, set the boundaries within 
which the district court's equitable discretion must operate" Ashby v. Ashby. 2010 
UT 7, f 34, 227 P.3d 246 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] contract 
functions in part to apportion risk of future events between the contracting parties. 
Moreover, parties are free to allocate the risk of future events between them however they 
wish." Deep Creek Ranch. LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd.. 2008 UT 3, fL9, 178 P.3d 886. 
In the instant matter, Nielsen argued that the trill court was correct in determining 
the existence of an agreement between the parties. Nielsen has also argued that CCW Ranch 
only relied upon the parts of the record that were beneficial to their position. However, little 
evidence and testimony is available regarding the telephone conversation that became the 
alleged "agreement" over the fences. CCW Ranch set fcrth all information contained in the 
record in this regard and Nielsen's bold assertion that other evidence exists is incorrect and 
unsupported. 
15 
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Wilberg of CCW Ranch testified that Nielsen telephoned Wilberg because his cows 
were on Nielsen's property, and they then discussed the fact that new fences needed to be 
built. Tr. at pp. 26-29. They argued over who would take which side of the fence. In the 
end, Wilberg said he would take the south, Nielsen allegedly conceded that he would take the 
north, and the call ended. Id. Likewise, Nielsen testified that he had a conversation with 
Wilberg regarding the fences and that Wilberg had told him he was going to get a fencing 
agreement. Id. at p. 195. Nielsen testified he would not sign any agreement unless it 
benefited both parties equally. Id. Nielsen testified that Wilberg first wanted the north fence 
but then changed to the south fence after Nielsen indicated he had done recent repair work 
to the north fence. Id. Nielsen testified that he said "whatever" and hung up. Id. Nielsen 
also testified that the agreement was that they would build an adequate fence. Id. at p. 198. 
However, he then contradicted himself and testified that Wilberg never actually said anything 
about an adequate fence, only who would build which fence. Id. 
No specifics regarding the fences were mentioned in the conversation, nothing 
regarding the standards for the fence or when it needed to be completed was discussed. 
Under Watts the terms of a contract or agreement must be set forth with clarity and 
definiteness so that such agreement can be performed. Id. at p. 329. Furthermore, under 
BBRD. LC a meeting of the minds is fundamental to the integral features of an agreement. 
Id. at ^14. The specifics of the agreement were not set forth with clarity, definiteness, and 
no meeting of the minds existed, since the only thing agreed upon was that the fences 
needed to be replaced and that one party would do one fence and one would do the other. 
This does not constitute a valid agreement. 
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While the trial court believed that the parties' actions after the alleged "agreement" 
somewhat render the agreement enforceable, it ignored entirely that Nielsen's actions in 
initiated the action evidence otherwise. Nielsen filed suit against CCW Ranch for 
reimbursement for CCW Ranch's cattle coming through the fence Nielsen had failed to 
build. If Nielsen had timely responded by building the North fence as he was supposed to 
do under the alleged "agreement" then CCW Ranch's cattle would not have continued to 
trespass. Nielsen, who no longer had cattle grazing on his land, clearly did not believe an 
agreement existed and intended to just gain income from CCW Ranch for its cattle 
trespassing through the north fence area onto his land. The trial court authorized this 
behavior by enforcing such agreement. It was not until CCW Ranch filed a countersuit for 
breach of the agreement that Nielsen decided to abide by the precepts contained therein. 
Both parties needed to know^ what was expected of them with regards to the fence in 
order for an agreement to exist. Without the specifics being set forth, no agreement could 
exist. Nielsen did not believe an agreement existed or he would not have filed suit against 
CCW Ranch. Nielsen built a fence that was inadequate only after realizing the remedy that 
CCW Ranch had against him in their counter suit. Nielsen's fence, however, did not meet 
any fencing or BLM guidelines and will likely require much maintenance in the future 
because of it, evidencing the further prejudice in the- trial court's allocation of future 
maintenance costs. 
To actually acknowledge the creation of an agreement, one must "admit, affirm, 
declare, testify, avow, confess, or own as genuine" or they must admit or affirm that they 
have an obligation or responsibility. Black's Law Dictionary at p. 16. One cannot admit or 
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affirm that they have a responsibility if they do not know the details of all parties' 
responsibilities. While both parties knew they had a responsibility to fence either the north 
or south side of the property, they did not know the specifications of such a fence and when 
it should be accomplished. Nielsen allowed the time to lapse to CCW Ranch's detriment of 
having to continue paying for their cattle trespassing through the fence line and grazing on 
Nielsen's property. Therefore, without specifics an agreement could not be acknowledged. 
Prior to closing arguments in this matter, the teal court was under the impression 
that neither party was arguing in favor of upholding the agreement. During closing 
arguments, Nielsen's counsel indicated to the trial court that Nielsen believed that 5.1 
applied in this matter and that there was not an agreement between the parties. Tr. at p. 509. 
However, just a moment later counsel indicated that they only believe that 5.1 applied if it 
was determined that there was not an agreement to build an adequate fence between the 
parties. Id. at p. 511. The court then indicated that counsel had contradicted himself and 
asked if he was arguing that an agreement existed. Id. Counsel indicated that they were 
arguing that an agreement did exist. Id. Based upon this exchange, it appears that Nielsen 
changed his mind when it became apparent that he cculd not win this matter under the 
interpretation of the statue. The trial court erroneously authorized such to CCW Ranch's 
detriment, just as it allowed Nielsen to "cure" the action after it had been filed. N o validly 
binding agreement regarding the fences existed in this matter and the statute must be looked 
at to determine who is responsible for the construction and maintenance of the fences. 
III. CCW R A N C H HAS N E V E R A R G U E D T H A T T H E STATUE I N 
T H I S MATTER WAS AMBIGUOUS. 
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In his brief, Nielsen concedes that UTAH CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1(2) is unambiguous, 
but erroneously argues that legislative intent in creating such statute should not be 
considered. Brief of Appellee at p. 40. Resultant of this erroneous argument, Nielsen boldly 
asserts that this Court should decline to consider addenda in CCW Ranch's opening brief 
and should only rely on the record on appeal. Id. 
In General Const. & Development Inc. v. Peterson Plumbing Supply, it states as 
follows regarding the interpretation of a statute: 
In interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language. We read statutory 
provisions literally, unless such a reading would result in an unreasonable or 
inoperable result." State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ^31, (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Only if there is ambiguity or absurdity will we depart from the plain 
language to explore other sources of legislative ir tent. See State v. Jeffries, 2009 
UT 57, ]|8, 217 P.3d 265 ("Our duty to give effect to the plain meaning of a 
statute, however, should give way if doing so would work a result so absurd 
that the legislature could not have intended it."); R e ^ R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. 
Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Assfn, 2008 UT 80, ^[23, 199 P.3d 917 ("If the 
plain language is unambiguous then we need not ook beyond it, and no other 
interpretive tools are needed in analyzing the statute." (citation omitted)). 
Ibid., 2011 UT 1, f8. In Purcell v. Wilkins it states as follows: 
In 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) at page 237, the rule is stated as 
follows: "In a statute the word 'may' can be construed in a mandatory sense only 
where such construction is necessary to give effect to the clear policy and intention of the 
"Legislature, and where there is nothing in the connection vr the language, or in the sense or 
policy of the provision to require an unusual interpretation, it is used as merely 
permissive and discretionary"—citing cases from the United States courts, 
Canada, and 34 states of the Union, including one from Utah, Eslinger v. Pratt, 
14 Utah, 117, 46 Pac. 763. (emphasis added.) 
Ibid, 57 Utah 467,195 P. 547, 548, (Utah 1921). 
In the instant matter, Nielsen argues that CCW Ranch believes that UTAH CODE 
ANN. §4-26-5.1 is ambiguous. Nielsen misreads CCW Ranch's opening brief once again. 
CCW Ranch has never argued that the statute in this matter is ambiguous, but resorts to 
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explanation by Ure to evidence only that the plain language is just that—plain and 
intentional. CCW Ranch seeks to uphold the plain language of the statue. The plain 
language of the statue indicates that the building of a fence and any future maintenance is to 
be split 50/50 or Vz the cost between the parties. UTAH CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 states in 
pertinent as follows: 
A qualified landowner may require the qualified adjoining landowner to pay 
for 1/2 of the cost of the fence if: (a) the fence is or becomes a partition fence 
separating the qualified landowner's land from that belonging to the qualified 
adjoining landowner; (b) the cost is reasonable for that type of fence; (c) that 
type of fence is commonly found in that particular area; and (d) the 
construction of the fence is no more expensive than the cost for posts, wire, 
and connectors. (3) If the qualified adjoining landowner refuses, the qualified 
landowner may maintain a civil action against the qualified adjoining 
landowner for 1/2 of the cost of that portion of the fence. (4) The cost of the 
maintenance of the fence shall also be apportioned between each party based 
upon the amount of land enclosed. A party who fails to maintain his part of 
the fence is also liable in a civil action for any damage sustained by the other 
party as a result of the failure to maintain the fence. 
(Emphasis added). 
The plain language of the statute should govern this matter and the cost to construct 
the fences and maintain them should be split 50/50 between the parties. However, it was 
the trial court in this matter who interpreted the statute in a way that requires a finding of 
ambiguity, as it went outside the plain language of the statute by ordering CCW Ranch be 
responsible for a larger part of the fence maintenance based upon the amount of land they 
own. This was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Should this Court find in favor of the 
trial court on this issue, then an ambiguity exists and resorting to the intent of the legislature 
is required in interpreting the statue and determining whether the trial court erred. 
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Under either interpretation, the trial court erred. As is evidenced in CCW Ranch's 
opening brief the intent of the legislature is also that the cost of the fence and subsequent 
maintenance be 50/50 split between the parties. N o 'difference exists between the plain 
language of the statute and the intent of the legislature in creating the statute. Both the 
statute and the intent of the legislature indicate that the costs to build the fence and to 
maintain the fence should be split equally between the benefitting parties. 
Based upon the addendum attached to CCW Raich's opening brief and specifically 
the affidavit of David Ure, who sponsored the bill that ted to the creation of the statute in 
question, it is clear that the legislative intent was to uphold the plain language of the statue 
and have neighboring land owners split the cost of fencing and maintenance 50/50. See 
Affidavit of David Ure ("Ure Affidavit") attached to CCW Ranch's Opening Brief as 
Addendum "C". The legislative intent clearly defeats the trial court's determination in this 
matter that something other than 50/50 applied. 
It should be noted however, that both parties favor the reading of the plain language 
of the statute, but both parties have different interpretations of what that plain language 
indicates. This may support that such statute could be ambiguous and would require 
resorting to legislative intent for determination. If the way both parties interpret the statute 
can be upheld by the plain language, then legislative intent will govern this Court's decision. 
The Ure Affidavit has not been challenged by Nielsen, and such affidavit shows the true 
legislative intent. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in making a determination that is 
outside the plain language of the statute. 
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Nielsen further argues in this matter that use of the word "may" in the plain language 
of the statue is discretionary and not mandatory. Brief of Appellee at p. 42. However, this 
language pertains to the discretion given a property owner to bring suit against another and 
has little to do with the allocation of responsibility between property owners. The plain 
language clearly shows that a trial could does not maintain discretion in the allocation. UTAH 
CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 (4)(using the word "shall.") 
Additionally, in certain instances the word "may" has been considered to be 
mandatory (see Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County 659 P.2d 1030, 
(Utah,1983), indicating that where legislative intent was to impose a duty on a public officer 
rather than a discretionary power even the word may has been held to be mandatory). 
However, allowing the allocation to be discretionary in this matter would not only be a 
misinterpretation of the plain language, but contradict the clear policy and intention of the 
legislature in the creation of the statue. Wilkins at p. 548. Reading the statute in this matter 
with the word "may" being used in a discretionary sense causes the statute to be rendered 
meaningless. 
Anytime a property owner constructs any kind of fence that benefits both properties, 
the owners share in the cost of such fence. This is true even in the city or suburbs. Both of 
the owners benefit equally from the construction, so why would they not share equally in the 
fence cost? Allowing the word "may" to be applied to the allocation in the statute allows for 
one neighbor to put up a fence, thus conveying a benefit to their neighbor, but without 
ability to rely on the statute for any kind of compensation. There would be no purpose to 
the statute at all in such an interpretation. 
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Thus, as the legislature intended for the parties to rely upon the statute to split the 
costs of fencing 50/50 use of the word "may" is considered mandatory. Any other use of 
the word "may" does not show the clear policy or intent of the legislature and would lead to 
unusual use of the word. Wilkins at p. 548. Statutes containing the word "may" cannot be 
interpreted to be discretionary if in allowing "may" to be discretionary a statute is rendered 
meaningless and against the clear intent of the legislature. Therefore, the use of the word 
"may" in UTAH CODE ANN. §4-26-5.1 either does not pertain to the trial court's ability to 
allocate or is mandator}7 and should be interpreted accorcingly. 
IV. THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS MADE IN THIS MATTER 
GO AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
In his brief Nielsen argues the judgment that was reached in this matter does not go 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Brief of Appellee at p. 44. Nielsen indicates that CCW 
Ranch has set forth evidence to support its arguments on appeal but that other evidence 
exists to support the trial court's ultimate determinations. Id. at p. 45. However, Nielsen has 
not pointed out any other "evidence" than that which was set forth in the opening brief. 
Once again Nielsen relies upon the matter of 438 Main Street to make this argument, 
but fails to realize that such case pertains only to ensuring a matter is capable of appellate 
review. Nielsen has not indicated how he believes the matter to be incapable of review. 
CCW Ranch has not argued against the findings of the court in making its arguments 
regarding the weight of the evidence or how the trial court applied the evidence to the law. 
Thus, Nielsen has again misinterpreted the case law he attempts to have support his 
position. 
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Further, Nielsen has argued that CCW Ranch failed to marshal the evidence 
regarding this argument, but has not indicated from where this position finds support. 
There was no requirement for CCW Ranch to marshal the evidence as they do not object to 
the sufficiency of the evidence, but only the way in wliich the trial court weighed it. As 
CCW Ranch has made no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the marshaling 
requirement does not apply. 
CONCLUSION { 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, CCW Ranch respectfully requests that 
this Court review this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems necessary. 
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2011. 
Joane Pappas White 
Attorney for CCW Ranch, LLC 
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Further, Nielsen has argued that CCW Ranch failed to marshal the evidence 
regarding tins argument, but has not indicated from where this position finds support. 
There was no requirement for CCW Ranch to marshal the evidence as they do not object to 
the sufficiency of the evidence, but only the way in wliich the trial court weighed it. As 
CCW Ranch has made no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the marshaling 
requirement does not apply. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, CCW Ranch respectfully requests that 
tins Court review this matter and take any such further action as this Court deems necessary. 
D A T E D this 23 rd day of February, 2011. 
joane Pappas White 
Attorney for CCW Ranch, LLC 
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